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Traditional Village Councils, Modern
Associations, and the Emergence of
Hybrid Political Orders in Rural
Morocco
SYLVIA I. BERGH
This essay aims to emphasize the relevance and analytical usefulness of
the concept of hybrid political orders with regard to a state and a society
that is neither in a post-war nor peace-building situation. Rather, the case
of rural Morocco illustrates how hybrid political orders emerge over
time, in the context of post-colonial state-building in general, and in the
context of decentralization reforms, the proliferation of participatory
programs, and the growth of ‘‘civil society’’ in particular.
Before the French protectorate (1912–1956), Morocco was subjectedto the authority of the King (then called the Sultan) and his
administration. This administration ruled over about 600 Arab and
Berber tribes through a hierarchy of ‘‘agents of authority’’ (agents
d’autorite´). These tribes, in turn, had their own modes of governance,
which took the form of the jema’a. This was an assembly presided by an
elder, the amghar, and which was elected regularly. These assemblies
existed at three levels: the village (douar), faction, and tribe, with each
level composed of representatives of the lower level. The jema’a at the
douar level was the most active and managed economic activities such
as irrigation, settled conflicts, and served as intermediary between the
population and the agents d’autorite´.
During the French protectorate, the Native Affairs system (Service
des Affaires Indige`nes) succeeded in penetrating local tribes and gradually
incorporating them within the colonial system. This was achieved by
repressing the nomadic tribal practices, land expropriation and privatiza-
tion of collective lands, taking control of local markets, and making the
jema’a elders (imgharn) permanent officers of central government.
After independence, the newly created Ministry of the Interior
built on the previous system of agents d’autorite´ (although the actual
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incumbents were now Moroccan government employees) and estab-
lished a single chain of command in the tribal areas. In this way, the
whole tribal system (and 36,000 villages) was drawn into the arena of
national politics.
Similarly, in 1957, in order to create electoral districts for the first
elections of independent Morocco, the Interior Minister appointed an
Itinerant Commission to set up proper rural municipalities or
communes. An important rationale was to achieve economic viability
as a framework for local government, and to substitute the commune
for the tribe as a focus of local loyalty. Yet in the first communal
elections held on May 29, 1960, the old rural elites seem to have kept
their audience. The candidates sought the endorsement of the jema’a
before officially declaring themselves candidates, and many of the pre-
Independence agents d’autorite´ were elected.
In the decades that followed, the decentralization process continued,with local governments being given increasing administrative, fiscal,
and political autonomy. In parallel, and with the adoption of structural
adjustment policies in 1983 that led to economic liberalization and the
withdrawal of the state, the government began to explicitly call on the
emerging civil society organizations to take over some of its tasks in
order to stem the rise in poverty and fall in human development
indicators. Social development became a government priority in the
1990s, and as in most developing countries, international organizations
started to insist that nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) be
associated with their projects, or even implement them.
A series of (government and donor-funded) national rural
infrastructure programs was launched in the 1990s, aimed at the
provision of electricity (PERG), drinking water (PAGER), and roads
(PNRR), as well as education and health facilities. For the first time,
such programs were based on the notion of partnership between
government administration, local authorities, and beneficiaries. Cost-
sharing dominated the rationale for such partnerships, however, and
participatory techniques were used as a means to gain the adherence of
the population rather than as a modus operandi.
At the same time, more localized projects, especially those
implemented by the Water and Forest authorities in the area of
watershed management, sought to achieve community-driven develop-
ment. At the core of these projects was the formulation and
implementation of community development plans, mostly focused on
a village or douar. Other participatory approaches were tested in the
irrigation sector by establishing Agricultural Water User Associations,






























and in the rain-fed sector through fifty Rainfed Agriculture
Development Projects (Projets de mise en valeur en bour).
Building on these experiences, a plan to eliminate rural poverty by
2020—the ‘‘2020 Rural Development Strategy’’—was adopted in 1999.
In the Strategy, broad-based rural development is identified as the key
to sustainable rural poverty alleviation. The participation of all
development stakeholders is among the Strategy’s guiding principles.
Following on from the Strategy, the Ministry of Agriculture and the
Water and Forest authorities are implementing a series of integrated
and participatory rural development programs targeted at disadvan-
taged areas, with funding from multilateral and bilateral donors.
In terms of their methodology, participatory approaches to rural
development channel project funding or capacity-building investments
directly to communities. Participatory methodologies frequently
promote the creation of more formal ‘‘community’’ organizations so
as to transform the ‘‘participants’’ into more institutionalized
‘‘partners’’ or ‘‘stakeholders’’ in the project. Such organizations are
commonly referred to as Community Based Organizations (CBOs).
They can vary in their degree of formality, depending on their legal
status, formally stated rights and responsibilities, and their governance
structure for recruiting members, selecting leaders, and conducting
affairs.
In Morocco, the notion of association in the modern sense was
introduced by a royal decree (dahir) in 1941. It allowed only the French
settlers to create associations and prohibited Moroccans from doing so.
Only the Law on Public Liberties of 1958 (which was, in turn, largely
inspired by the French law on associations of 1901) accorded the right
to associate to everyone. It defines ‘‘association’’ as the ‘‘agreement by
which two or more persons pool their knowledge or activity in a
permanent manner for a purpose other than sharing profits.’’ The 1958
Law was amended by the dahir of April 10, 1973. Because many
members of the underground leftist political opposition had found
refuge in associations, the 1973 dahir gave significant powers to public
authorities to sanction and dissolve associations.
After intense lobbying by civil society, the parliament approved a
new law on associations on April 11, 2002. This new law strikes a
balance between an opening up toward civil society and the
maintenance of ‘‘soft’’ state control. Although it is easier for an
association to be considered legal, the law introduced some additional
bureaucratic control measures and gives a substantial role to the caı¨d.
Having briefly reviewed the history of social organization and the
emergence of modern formal governance structures in rural areas in
Morocco (both in the form of communes and associations or CBOs), I






























turn now to an exploration of how these structures interact with the
indigenous informal societal forces such as the jema’a, and give rise to
hybrid political orders.
Drawing on doctoral field research in the High Atlas mountainsduring 2005–2006 (in Al Haouz province near Marrakech), I find
that the number of associations in this region has increased
dramatically over the last decade. According to official sources, in
1997, there were only three associations, while in 2006 there were 1400.
This growth can be seen as a local reflection of the national and donor
dynamics described earlier.
The most famous of the village associations in the province is that
in the village of Aı¨t Iktel in the commune of Abadou. The Association
Aı¨t Iktel de De´veloppement was founded in 1995, following a successful
drinking water project. The association actively encourages the
contributions of its internal and international emigrants, and empha-
sizes the principle of equity in access to basic infrastructure. Apart from
drinking water provision, its projects include the construction of
irrigation canals, electricity supply, health dispensary upgrading,
informal schooling, and the construction of boarding houses for
children near the commune’s secondary school. For the latter, the
association was awarded the Aga Khan prize for architecture in 2001.
Most importantly, the success of this association can be largely
attributed to the successful re-adaptation of the role of the jema’a, the
traditional village council. This was done by taking into account the
growing influence of emigrants, women, and youth, as well as
preserving its main operating principles: information sharing, decision
making by consensus, and the inclusive nature of the projects. Of
course, the association’s reputation and human resource base facilitate
access to funding, and the relationships with the authorities and
provincial ministerial delegations.
This example illustrates very well the common argument that the
local associations in rural areas are a natural extension of the village
jema’a and other traditional practices of solidarity. The remarkable
associative dynamic in the remote villages of the Souss region is
attributed to the survival of the (mostly Berber) communal traditions of
mutual help and solidarity (for example, twiza, mutual help with
agricultural work; agadir, collective storage facilities; and the ouzi’a, the
collective purchase of livestock).
As in the time before the French protectorate, the jema’a is still
commonly defined as the group of (older) men who make up a
restricted but permanent council (whose membership in meetings,
however, can vary according to the tasks at hand), based on the lineage






























structure of the village. It organizes collective works or those of public
interest (for example, the maintenance of irrigation canals and the
mosque), settles disputes, and takes on various ritual functions.
Petrzelka and Bell show that forms of solidarity can change from one
village to the next; for example, it is possible to find twiza (generalized
reciprocity; exchange without expectation of direct equal return) in one
village, and direct reciprocity (expectation of equal return) in another.
There are also some myths surrounding the jema’a as an institution.First and foremost is the erroneous notion that it is egalitarian. As
Hassan Rachik points out, the jema’a is nothing but the political
manifestation of the power structure that prevails in the group in
question. Second, such social structures, while reassuring for their
members and protecting the individual, can be very constraining,
leaving little room for personal initiative and self-fulfillment. This is
related to what Miche`le Kasriel calls a ‘‘permanent auto-censure,’’
given that each individual lives continuously under the gaze of the
group. This stands in contrast to the Western understanding of
associative action as a personal, voluntary effort that one freely
consents to.
Nevertheless, the relationship between the association and the
jema’a is important for the level of participation that villagers are ready
to engage in. My findings show that where the association and the
jema’a work closely together, such participation is easier to obtain.
Examples of popular participation in association projects include
contributing land (for tourism lodges), manual labor, transport of
materials, and local building materials such as sand—all to be used in
the construction of mosques, drinking water networks, and dirt tracks.
Indeed, for many association members, the association is playing
the same role as the jema’a, but has the advantage of being a legal entity
now. As one member put it, ‘‘The association is like a developed form
of the jema’a.’’ This legal status is needed in order to implement
government- and donor-funded (‘‘participatory’’) projects. As another
interviewee said, ‘‘Even the government administration won’t talk to
you if you don’t have an association in your village. If they have a
project to give to a village they always want to communicate and work
with an association.’’ In many cases, however, the village’s informal
rules prescribe that the association must invite members from the
jema’a when holding discussions about such projects. This can be seen
as an attempt to preserve the advantage of the flexible membership that
characterizes the jema’a (where members were selected according to the
nature of the issue at hand) in the new formal forms of association with
fixed committee positions. The strong linkages between the jema’a and






























associations also explain why most associations are only interested in
developing their own village and are fiercely guarding its ‘‘sovereignty.’’
There are indications that the new forms of associations have a
negative impact on the old traditions of solidarity (such as twiza).
‘‘There is no longer this sense of twiza after the creation of the
association; now when you ask them for something they say ‘you
should ask the members of the association committee.’’’ Similarly, as
the founder of another association explained:
Before creating the association there was a sense of teamwork in the jema’a;
the people made groups for twiza, etc. […] Before, there was a sense of
solidarity, for example to collect money and they did not have this fear; but
now when you ask someone for 10 Dirham [approximately 1 Euro] they won’t
give it to you because they have doubts; you always have to tell them what it is
for. This way the people become obstacles for the work of the association.
This mistrust also means that the population is much less willing to
work for free, and thus expect the association to pay them.
The relationship between the association and the jema’a can befurther complicated by the rumors of big sums of money that come
with donor-funded or government projects and whose disbursement
methods are not transparent, at least not for the villagers. This can lead
to the committee members of village associations being accused by the
jema’a of embezzling project funds for their personal profit. In some
cases, the rift between the association and members of the jema’a stems
from the belief—often justified—that the association was created for
political reasons. That is, that the presidents of such associations use
them as platforms to mobilize electoral support among the benefici-
aries.
Linked to this issue of trust is therefore the extent to which the
general population understands the concept of association. Some
presidents complained that the lack of cooperation between the jema’a
and the association is due to the jema’a’s lack of awareness of the
purpose of an association. ‘‘Once the association was created they [the
jema’a] thought that it will do something right away but they never
joined the association—they don’t know what it means.’’ As one
president pointed out, however, ‘‘the association cannot right away
take over from the jema’a,’’ and the process of building trust and
understanding is slowly taking place.
Indeed, several associations found that they first had to educate
the population about what an association is or does. The first successful
project or simply holding open elections are also seen as good ways to






























gain people’s trust. Some projects promote the use of ‘‘village
committees,’’ which essentially represent the jema’a of the village as a
first step toward becoming an association.
The jema’a is thus still very much present behind the fac¸ade of the
formalized village associations. According to an official at the Ministry
of Agriculture, the head of the jema’a sometimes becomes president of a
new Water User Association, but in any case, the jema’a is always there
behind the scenes. As he expressed it, during his visits, ‘‘it is the paper
that speaks but when I’m gone it is the jema’a.’’ The fact that some
associations have their offices located inside the mosque—where the
jema’a usually meets every Friday—illustrates well the strong linkages
and overlaps between the new, modern forms of governance structures
and customary authority.
There are also cases where the association and the jema’a do nothave any links at all, such as when the association is inactive or has
different objectives from the jema’a. Another potential reason for the
lack of any relations is the age and generation gap. In some villages, it
seems that the association was founded by the youth who want to
implement ‘‘modern’’ ideas and who see the members of the jema’a
(representing the older generation) as responsible for the under-
development of the village. In one case, the village association was
founded to right a wrong that the jema’a (the older generation) had
committed, namely having been tricked into giving away a piece of
village land to an NGO for the construction of a tourist lodge without
ensuring a fair share of the tourism profits in return.
The findings presented here confirm the typology outlined by Aziz
Chaker, who describes three types of relationships between jema’as and
the associations. In the first case, the association is subservient to the
jema’a and, in many cases, the members are present in both entities.
Here, the concern for representativeness overrides the need for
professional competence or operational effectiveness. In many such
cases, the association’s decision making is slow and it becomes more of
a modern instrument that reproduces the traditional norms rather than
a tool to promote social change. In the second case, a younger
generation is pushing for change but is still taking into account the
existing balance of power. Hence, in a transitory phase, they may
include some members of the jema’a in their committees who play the
role of intermediaries between the two entities. This facilitates the
exchange of information and mobilization, as well as the acquisition of
land for the association’s projects, although there is the danger that
conflicts and traditional antagonisms in the jema’a are exported to the






























association. Finally, relationships between the association and the
jema’a can be hampered by mistrust.
My findings on the internal governance mechanisms of the village
associations also point to the often very strong links with the jema’a. It
proved to be difficult to establish whether a committee had been elected
or appointed. Mostly, it seems the committee members were chosen in a
process called taradi, or mutual consensus, by the jema’a of the village.
In only very rare cases were the committee elections restricted to votes
by the paid-up members.
Indeed, the concept of ‘‘membership’’ in an association is not well-
anchored in local practice—almost 40 percent of the 50 associations in
the sample do not have any ordinary members, and women are absent
almost completely, both as committee and ordinary members. Many
association presidents affirmed, however, that ‘‘the whole village’’ is a
member, pointing to the strong identification with the institution of the
jema’a in which each lineage is represented.
In general, if we assess the formal associations according to‘‘Western’’ definitions of developmental activity, or of good internal
governance (record-keeping, regular meetings and elections, member-
ship, accounting systems, and most important of all, maintaining the
divide between ‘‘civil’’ and ‘‘political’’ societies), we come to rather
sobering conclusions: a considerable proportion of associations are
inactive and only exist on paper, internal governance is weak, and the
associations are for the most part run by (aspiring) politicians.
To conclude, I would argue that by focusing on the ‘‘modern’’
formal institutions, we miss out on an opportunity to fully understand
the dynamics of customary institutions, and how these two interact to
lead to the emergence of hybrid political orders. If we understand such
orders, we may also be in a position to develop ‘‘hybrid’’ solutions:
formalizing the management procedures of associations and making
them transparent to the communities at large but in a way that
preserves the organizational fluidity that characterizes the jema’a, and
most importantly, does not undermine traditional forms of intra-village
solidarity.
The evidence presented here also shows that the customary
institution of the jema’a still determines, to a large extent, who can
claim legitimate leadership in the ‘‘modern’’ spheres of both ‘‘civil
society’’ (committee members of village associations) as well as
‘‘political society’’ (political councilors). Central government and
donors would do well to heed this fact when promoting ‘‘participatory’’
programs and decentralization reforms.
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